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THE FUNDAMENTALS OF AN ELECTRONIC-
BASED FEDERAL SECURITIES ACT
JAMES D. COX*
What if among his other important accomplishments, Theodore Roosevelt
had invented the transistor and thereby unleashed the rapid pace of computer
technology fifty years earlier than it occurred? By making very bold
assumptions about the pace of related technological developments-fiber
optics, software, imaging-we could envision that investors in 1930 were not
only grappling with the Great Depression, but also were connected by the
Internet and had vast information retrieval opportunities on the World Wide
Web. This Article examines what the structure of an electronic-based
securities act would be if technological conditions that prevail today existed
as well in 1933.
To assume what did not occur, namely the dawn of the computer age at
the turn of the 20th Century, may strike many as unnecessary and an
awkward setting to discuss the impact of technology on the Securities Act of
1933 ("Securities Act" or "the Act").' The assumption does, however,
simplify the discussion of what ought to be the focus and operation of the
Securities Act in the age of the World Wide Web; the assumption, bold as it
is, removes the troubling inertial forces of the regulatory culture that has
developed in the administration and practice of the Securities Act.2 Any broad
re-examination of the securities laws must necessarily address the many
practices, and even theologies, that have developed over the years, both
within the Securities Exchange Commission ("SEC") and among securities
professionals that trace their roots to the regulatory commitment made in
1933. For example, in retrospect, we may question whether there would be an
obligation to deliver a final prospectus to investors or even if there would be a
prospectus requirement at all However, because this was a key feature to the
* Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law.
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1994).
2. On the capacity of the SEC's culture to nurture or otherwise embrace wholesale regulatory
changes, see Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC as a Bureaucracy: Public Choice, Institutional Rhetoric,
and the Process of Policy Formation, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 527 (1990). There is, of course, the
additional retarding force of inertia, as well as the private sector "investment" in the existing
regulatory mechanisms. See Gregg A. Jarrell, Change at the Exchange: The Causes and Effects of
Deregulation, 27 J.L. & ECON. 273 (1984); Jonathan R. Macey, Administrative Agency Obsolescence
and Interest Group Formation: A Case Study of the SEC at Sixty, 15 CARDOZo L. REv. 909 (1994).
3. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.420-434 (1996).
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Securities Act's overall scheme of "filtering" information to investors, and the
practice has become expected among investors and market professionals, any
proposal to dispense with this practice must deal with the expectations that
have evolved over nearly seventy years among investors who have grown
accustomed to a the more paternalistic delivery of prospectus requirement.4
I. THE BAGGAGE OF THE SECURITIES ACT'S TRANSACTION ORIENTATION
The most troubling issues posed by the Securities Act trace their cause to
the Act's transactional focus. Under the Securities Act, the public offering of
securities, whether by their issuer or a control person, sets in motion a
regulatory process that assumes an information void surrounds the issuer and
the offering. Though the assumption has great practical and, therefore,
regulatory appeal in the case of the initial public offering, it has long been
recognized that the regulatory process should not be blind to the substantial
body of information available to investors regarding companies that are
publicly traded.5 Certainly there is cause to question why the regulatory
framework that is acceptable for equity trading markets that are nearly thirty-
five times the dollar volume of the amount of equity offerings registered with
the SEC6 should not be equally sufficient for most public companies offering
their securities for sale.
The integrated disclosure system the SEC introduced in 1983' did not
overcome the Securities Act's transactional focus. For example, available
data reflects that registrants qualified to use the integrated disclosure system
4. On this point, consider the SEC's and industry's support for a process of accommodating
both the requirements that a "final prospectus" be delivered and that the settlement date must occur
within three days of the trade. See Prospectus Delivery, Securities Act Release No. 7168, (1995
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,601, at 86,311 (May 11, 1995). Because the T+3 rule,
17 C.F.R. § 240.15c6-1 (1996), effectively prevents the preparation and delivery of a prospectus
containing the materials in an effective registration statement. New Rule 434 departs from past
practices by allowing the final prospectus to be contained in a series of prescribed communications,
including a preliminary prospectus (which formerly was used only prior to the registration statement
becoming effective). 17 C.F.R. § 230.434 (1996). The regulatory response to the practical problem
posed by Rule 15c6-1's requirement for settlements within three days of the trade was defining a
document that could meet both the shortened requirements and the received model of a culminating
disclosure statement.
5. For the most sweeping consideration of this matter, see Report of the Advisory Committee on
Corporate Disclosure to the Securities and Exchange Commission, Part I (November 3, 1977).
6. See Report of the Advisory Committee on the Capital Formation and Regulatory Processes,
app. A at 45-46 (SEC 1996) [hereinafter Report of the Advisory Committee].
7. See Adoption of Integrated Disclosure System, Securities Act Release No. 6383, 47 Fed.
Reg. 11380 (Mar. 16,1982).
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continue to incur nontrivial delays and costs in complying with that system.'
This occurs not because of the need for new disclosures to be filed with the
SEC-by definition, most of the important financial information about the
issuer under integrated disclosure has previously been filed with the SEC
under the Exchange Act, so that only the more benign transaction specific
information need be created-but because of the greater liability the issuer
and others incur for omissions and misstatements in report information
submitted under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act") 9
when that information becomes part of the Securities Act registration
statement. As discussed later, the Securities Act's transactional focus finds its
source and continued vitality because of section 1 l's demanding liability
standards. And, it is not likely that the burdensome effects of this
transactional focus will subside so long as the issuer, and others such as
underwriters, accountants and directors who have burdensome due diligence
requirements, remain liable under section 11 for omissions and misstatements
when the registration statement becomes effective.
The Securities Act's present transaction orientation has all the appeal of a
suit advertised as "one size fits all." The burdens of this transaction
orientation transcend the significant liability burdens faced by those subject to
section 11. For example, the transaction focus is the hallmark of the operation
of the Securities Act's exemptions. At the core of the exemptive process is the
need to define the offering, which in turn implicates the doctrine that
interdependent offerings of the same class of securities are for regulatory
purposes integrated so that collectively they must either be registered or meet
the criteria for an exemption from registration.'0 The offering concept was
natural within the 1933-vintage paradigm whereby small start-up companies
8. See Report of the Advisory Committee, supra note 6, app. A., tbl. 2, at 48 (average time at
the SEC in 1994 & 1995 of registration materials for Form S-2 and Form S-3 registrants was 15.6 days
and 9.3 days, respectively).
9. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811 (1994).
10. Securities Act exemptions promulgated by the SEC provide much needed certainty against
integration by providing distinct time periods during which offerings will not be integrated. See, e.g.,
Securities Act Rule 251(cXl), 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(c)(1) (1996) (Regulation A offerings will not be
integrated with earlier offers or sales); Securities Act Rule 502(a), 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(a) (1996)
(Regulation D offerings beyond six months of another offering will not be integrated.). Absent such a
safe harbor, the issuer must depend on the uncertainties inherent in the traditional factor analysis. See
Non-Public Offering Exemption, Securities Act Release No. 4552, 27 Fed. Reg. 11316 (Nov. 16,
1962); Exemption for Local Offerings from Registration, Securities Act Release No. 4434, 26 Fed.
Reg. 11896 (Dec. 13, 1962). See generally Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities, Integration
of Securities Offerings: Report of the Task Force on Integration, 41 BUS. LAW. 595 (1986).
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and established corporations each raised capital episodically through public
offers aimed at individual investors. The Securities Act's offering concept,
and related integration doctrine, are symptomatic of the Act's transactional
orientation in which the disclosure mechanism is aimed at the episodic event
of the issuer raising money through a broad public solicitation of investors.
Many issuers still do this, but the more seasoned issuers today have far more
options than they had in 1933, or even 1990, to meet their capital needs by the
sale of securities. It was practicable in 1933 to envision registration as
occurring only episodically. Today, because of technology and the
institutionalization of all facets of securities markets, capital raising
increasingly is a continuous process for rapidly growing publicly-traded
firms. Further electronic linkages among market professionals and their
clients will further render the offering concept as outdated and inappropriate
for today's capital markets.
Issuers today can privately place securities with an investment bank who
thereupon syndicates that offering pursuant to Rule 144A to qualified
institutional buyers ("QIBs") through the Private Offering, Resale and
Trading through Automated Linkages system ("PORTAL")." But this
approach is not without its own regulatory web. The burdens of this method
of financing is that the distributed security cannot be fungible with the
issuer's publicly traded security."2 This nonfungibility requirement essentially
is a limitation on resale and has a negative impact on the price at which the
distributed securities are sold by the issuer. Similarly, issuers who seek to
avoid registration under the Securities Act by offering their securities abroad
pursuant to Regulation S13 can expect those securities to be issued at a
substantial discount from the price at which the same security is traded in
U.S. capital markets. Again, there is a discount in the pricing of the shares
because of this minimal restriction on resales. The source of the discount is
Regulation S's resale restrictions which require that the foreign-offered
security remain "off shore" for at least 40 days.' 4 Because most U.S. issuers
11. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (1996).
12. Securities Act Rule 144A(d)(3), 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(d)(3) (1996).
13. Securities Act Rules 901-904, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.901-.904 (1996).
14. See Securities Act Rule 903(c)(2)(iii) & (c)(3)(ii), 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.903(c)(2)(iii) & (c)(3)(ii)
(1996). The resale restriction extends to one year for equity offerings by companies for which there is
a substantial U.S. investor interest, but which are not subject to the Exchange Act's continuous
reporting system. Securities Act Rule 903(c)(3)(iii)(A), 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(c)(3)(iii)(A) (1996). On
the problems posed by the resulting share discounts, see Bevis Longstreth & Joel B. Prager, "Gun
Jumping" Revisited: A Proposal to Prevent False Starts in Private Offerings, 21 SEC. REG. L.J. 235
[VCOL. 75:857
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using either Rule 144A or relying on Regulation S for their offshore offerings
are reporting companies, the major source of information to their QIBs or for
U.S. investors when the foreign offered securities flow back to the United
States is the information provided by the continuous reporting provisions of
the Exchange Act. The issuer, however, is not permitted to rely on such
information for conducting a public offering in the United States without
section 11 liability and must resort to exemptions, such as those embodied in
Rule 144A or Regulation S which impose their own costs in terms of the
resulting share discount incurred by the issuer.
Further evidence of the outmoded offering concept is the practical blurring
between public and private offerings. 5 Rule 144A effectively does more than
establish an institutional trading market. Its important impact is that by
assuring liquidity to privately placed securities it greatly facilitates the ability
of issuers to raise capital privately. We should question whether, given the
ability of purchasers of privately placed securities to offer those securities to
thousands of institutions via the PORTAL system, should such a transaction
continue to be viewed as truly private? Moreover, consider the effect of the
so-called A/B exchange, whereby the issuer agrees at some future date to
exchange newly registered securities for the formerly issued restricted
securities." The A/B exchange effectively allows the issuer to disconnect its
interface with the Securities Act's registration process from its entrance to
capital markets. Though we may herald the A/B exchange as an illustration of
how creative lawyering can overcome the Securities Act's regulatory
burdens, and thereby free the hand of capitalism, it should also be realized
that the issuer incurs nontrivial costs in doing so, and that those costs largely
are the result of the Securities Act's transactional focus.
Another feature of the Securities Act's transactional approach is its
preoccupation with public solicitation of investors. Exemptions such as
(1993).
15. More generally on this point, see Report of the Advisory Committee, supra note 6.
16. The SEC's no-action letters authorize A/B exchanges. See, e.g., Shearman & Sterling, SEC
No-Action Letter, [1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 176,704, at 78,039 (July 2, 1993).
The important issue in such no-action letter requests is whether the selling security holder will be an
underwriter and, among other burdens, be subject to section 11 liability in connection with its sales of
the registered security. Cf Byrnes v. Faulkner, Dawkins & Sullivan, 550 F.2d 1303 (2d Cir. 1977)
(sellers of registered securities received in exchange for unregistered securities violated section 5 by
failing to deliver a prospectus to their buyer). See generally Jennifer O'Hare, Institutional Investors,
Registration Rights and the Specter of Liability Under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, 1996
WIs. L. REv. 217.
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Regulation D 7 are not available if the offering is accompanied by general
advertisements and solicitations. And, such promotions are anathema to the
private offering exemption provided in section 4(2). Solicitation is interpreted
broadly so that communications that operate to condition the market
constitute impermissible "gun jumping."'" Yet, the unwavering obeisance to
fears of "conditioning the market" collides with the managers' responsibility
to inform their shareholders and the market of financially significant events
affecting the corporation. Though the SEC, through its safe harbor provisions
in Rule 135"9 and Rule 135c, 2' has permitted limited disclosures regarding an
upcoming public offering or private placement of securities,2' the disclosures
so permitted are narrowly circumscribed so that concern continues whether
the appropriate regulatory balance between "conditioning the market" and
informing trading markets has been struck. Against this preoccupation with
general solicitations and, more generally, conditioning the market, we may
once again question whether the "one size fits all" orientation makes sense.
For example, is it practicable or even desirable to discourage Chrysler
corporation from conditioning the market for securities it will soon offer for
sale? In a well publicized case, a public offering of Chrysler Financial
securities was scuttled and a much smaller amount was privately placed after
one of its proposed underwriters had circulated information about the offering
among some of its institutional clients.22 The result reached here is all the
more problematic when one considers that the Securities Act condones the
same underwriter making cold calls to unsophisticated investors without
17. Securities Act Rules 501-508, 17 C.F.Rt §§ 230.501-.508 (1996).
18. See generally Eric A. Chiappinelli, Gun Jumping: The Problem of Extraneous Offers of
Securities, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 457 (1989); Joseph P. Richards & Joseph E. Reece, Gun Jumping, 26
REV. SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 1 (1993).
19. 17 C.F.R. § 230.135 (1996).
20. 17 C.F.R. § 230.135c (1996).
21. The SEC has proposed further relaxing its stance regarding pre-offering promotional efforts
to permit issuers and their underwriters to "test the waters." See Commission Records and Information,
Securities Act Release No. 7188, [1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,639, at 86,885
(June 27, 1995) (proposing Rule 135d). However the rule as proposed will be limited to companies
that are not subject to the Exchange Act's continuous reporting provisions. Because of this focus,
Professor Coffee has suggested that proposed Rule 135d is ill-conceived because, among other faults,
it does not complement either the technology or market structure for such issuers of public offerings of
securities. See John C. Coffee Jr., SEC Deregulation: Sense and Nonsense, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 28, 1995,
at 5. Professor Coffee's criticisms of proposed Rule 135d are consistent with this Article's thesis that
technology and market institutionalization for publicly traded firms reject continuing the Securities
Act's transaction orientation for such firms.
22. See Michael Siconolfi, Bear Stearns Muffs Chrysler Financial $1 Billion Offering, WALL ST.
J., Feb. 4, 1992, at C13.
[VOL. 75:857
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providing any written materials, so long as a registration statement for the
offered securities has been filed with the SEC. It is difficult to understand
why, in an informationally rich environment such as that for Chrysler, the
public solicitation of investors should depend on the coincidence of filing
essentially the same documents with the SEC that embodies information that
is already on file with the SEC.
A final feature of the Securities Act's transactional approach is its
treatment of secondary distributions. Congress, in enacting the Securities Act,
believed distributions by a control person posed the same needs for disclosure
as distributions by issuers.' It accomplished this objective by expanding the
definition of underwriter so that it includes those who facilitate a distribution
of the control person's securities.24 The Securities Act identifies yet another
transaction for which disclosure and its allied burdens, such as potential
section 11 liability and prospectus delivery requirements, apply. These results
follow regardless of the richness of the information environment for the
issuer's security. Once again, the approach is that of one size fitting all.
Moreover, the regulatory burdens for such transactions are greater than are
those facing the issuer. First, there are fewer exemptions from registration
available for the control person's resales than are available for the security's
issuer. This occurs because the control person technically is not the issuer2'
and most Securities Act exemptions are issuer-based exemptions.26 Second, a
good deal of ambiguity surrounds the meaning of "control person" when
defining the scope of secondary distributions. Though the reports
accompanying the Securities Act's enactment appear to apply a test of
whether an individual had the power to compel the issuer to file a registration
statement, the SEC continues to adhere to a broader test dependent on one's
23. See H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 14 (1933) ("Such a public offering may possess all the dangers
attendant upon a new offering of securities.").
24. Securities Act of 1933 § 2(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(11) (1994).
25. Issuer is defined in section 2(4), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(4) (1994), so that it is the entity in which
the investment is made through the security. The control person is an issuer only for the limited
purpose of defining whether the actions of another are those of an underwriter. Securities Act of 1933
§ 2(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1 1) (1994).
26. Notable exceptions to this are that the intrastate exemption provided by section 3(a)(1 1), 15
U.S.C. § 77c(a)(1 1) (1994), also includes resales by control persons, and Regulation A's abbreviated
disclosure under Rule 251(b) is also available to control persons. 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(b) (1996). By
contrast, Rule 147, 17 C.F.RI § 230.147(a) (1996), provides an exemption only for the issuer's
intrastate offerings, and section 4(2)'s private offering exemption, 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1994), applies
only for issuers, as do the Regulation D exemptions, 17 C.F.R. 230.501-.508 (1996).
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power to influence the issuer's managerial policies.27 Thus, those within the
entity's managerial ranks are faced with the double concern of having a
narrow band of regulatory freedom for resales by control persons while being
uncertain whether this restricted environment applies to them.
Certainly the control person's disposition of shares merits regulation equal
to that of the issuer where the control person is but a conduit for taking the
corporation public. However, this occurs rarely and the more typical control
person transaction is that of control person selling some of her holdings in the
controlled entity rather than terminating her ownership in that entity. In either
case investors are likely to view a control person reducing or terminating her
ownership of the controlled firms as being material. Currently, the Securities
Act meets this need by triggering registration requirements for the control
person. An electronic-based securities act, on the other hand, could view the
control person's disposition as a materiality issue that could be handled
within its continuous reporting requirements. In this manner, the control
person's disposition would not expose the issuer to section 11 liability or the
accompanying needs to update its other SEC filings.
The above concerns played a dominant role in the call by the Advisory
Committee on the Capital Formation and Regulatory Processes for a
company registration system to be introduced on a voluntary basis for
seasoned companies with a public float of at least $75 million.2"
The effects of the merging of the public, private and offshore markets
on the operation of the current Securities Act concepts and the
protections are grounds for significant concern. It seems clear that
these concepts are no longer capable of achieving their purpose of
protecting investors, and are imposing substantial costs on insiders. In
the case of seasoned issuers, the benefits of attempting to preserve
these distinctions is unclear, given the significant costs and reduced
investor protection that comes from them. Rather, with regard to
seasoned issuers, the Committee concluded that investor protection
would be better served by a regulatory model that no longer attempts
to preserve any artificial distinctions among these markets. Instead, the
new regulatory model would provide for Securities Act protections for
all sales to purchasers in the United States (regardless of whether the
27. See Rutherford B. Campbell, Jr., Defining Control in Secondary Distributions, 18 B.C.
INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 37,40 (1976).
28. Report of the Advisory Committee, supra note 6, app. B, at 127.
[VCOL. 75:857
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securities were first offered abroad), and would extend the type of
discipline and quality of disclosure traditionally enjoyed by the
primary markets to the company's continuous reporting, for the benefit
of all the markets for the seasoned issuer's securities.29
The litany of the Securities Act's transactional focus reviewed above not
only supports the Advisory Committee's recommendations, but suggests that
those recommendations did not go far enough. The Advisory Committee not
only continues the transaction orientation for companies who do not meet the
proposed eligibility standards for the pilot project, but more importantly
continues to emphasize the role of section 11 liability for all public offerings.
As examined in Part III, so long as section 11 continues to be triggered by the
registration of securities, many of the ill effects of the Securities Act's
transactional focus will continue. A true company registration system should
not prescribe the applicable liability standard by the type of security
transaction that the issuer undertakes. Indeed, the electronic-based securities
act would not be one whose content is focused on the offering of securities
but rather it would be on the mechanisms by which information becomes
publicly available.
II. A THEORETICAL BASE FOR AN ELECTRONIC-BASED SECURITIES ACT
Congress enacted the Securities Act during the heady first hundred days of
the New Deal. The Act's proscription reflected the popular belief that the
collapse of the stock market was the result of fraudulent practices by
promoters and "the complete abandonment by many underwriters and dealers
in securities of those standards of fair, honest, and prudent dealing that should
be basic to the encouragement of investment in any enterprise."3 Aside from
the rhetoric that propelled the Securities Act into law, the Securities Act
sought to achieve investor protection and enhance investor confidence in
capital markets by imposing mandatory disclosure standards on issuers
through a public offerings registration process and by actively engaging
certain professionals in a certification process for registration statement
disclosures. Because the Act became law some four decades before
expressions such as "random walk" or "market efficiency" became popular,
the important mechanism for distributing the registration statement's
29. Id. app. A, at 45.
30. H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 2 (1933).
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information was through its filtration into the investment community via the
Act's prospectus delivery requirements. Thus, a crucial feature for investor
protection is not simply the Securities Act's requirements for the delivery of a
preliminary and final prospectus,3' but also the Commission rules requiring
that broker-dealers involved in the security's distribution have sufficient
copies of the issuer's prospectus.32
Though the Securities Act's prospectus delivery requirements are a
wondrous illustration of technical precision being carried out in an important
piece of social legislation, one's wonderment should not blind oneself to what
is really taking place within the interweaving statutes and their accompanying
regulations. After issuers have filed a registration statement, and before the
registration statement becomes effective, written offers, with very few
exceptions, may only occur within the context of a document, the preliminary
prospectus, that embodies the materials then on file with the SEC. Oral
solicitations, however, can and do occur and there is no requirement that
those orally solicited receive a prospectus, final or preliminary, before they
receive confirmation of their security purchases.33 Overreaching in the context
of such oral solicitations is policed through section 12(a)(2) which imposes
liability on the soliciting broker who commits an omission or misstatement,
unless "he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have
known, of such untruth or omission."'34 Clearly a broker who solicits an
investor's security purchase on the basis of representations that are
inconsistent with the prospectus will have a very difficult time meeting
section 12(a)(2)'s defense. Thus, the prospectus delivery requirements serve
two highly complementary purposes in terms of investor protection: (1) at
least among brokers and dealers, it sharpens section 12(a)(2)'s disciplinary
31. The prospectus delivery requirements originate from section 5(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b) (1994),
which applies to issuers, underwriters and dealers. See Securities Act of 1933 §§ 4(1), 4(3), 15 U.S.C.
§ 77d(1), (3) (1988).
32. See Securities Exchange Act Rule 15c2-8, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-8 (1996).
33. It is fraudulent practice for a broker to distribute a security for an issuer that is not a reporting
company, without delivering a preliminary prospectus at least 48 hours in advance of any confirmation
of sale to those to whom they expect to direct confirmations of sale. Securities Exchange Act Rule
15c2-8, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-8 (1996). Parallel requirements appear in the SEC's decision to
accelerate the effective date of the registration statement. See Insurance Company Qualified Pension
Plans Exemption, Securities Act Release No. 4968 [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 77,730, at 83,671 (Apr. 24, 1969). Even in the instance of such a mailing, however, if the
prospectus arrived after the broker mailed the confirmation, the confirmation would be effective so that
the prospectus could not thereafter be the basis for the investor withdrawing his offer to purchase.
34. Security Exchange Act of 1933 § 12(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(1994).
[VOL. 75:857
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol75/iss2/7
AN ELECTRONIC-BASED FEDERAL SECURITIES ACT
effects, 5 and (2) it disseminates information about the offering.
Neither of these objectives necessarily depends on the solicited investor
actually reading the prospectus or understanding its contents. The Securities
Act is, in view of the times of its enactment, surprisingly agnostic on whether
the typical investor would actually understand the contents of the registration
statement. The object of registration was to obtain truthful filings by
registrants and the prospectus delivery requirements were designed to make
that information publicly available.
As the culture changed from a paper-based to an electronic-based
dissemination of information, the SEC and the Securities Act have each
proven adaptable. Information previously circulated in the bulky prospectus
can now be electronically transmitted.36 But, the capacity of the Securities Act
to accommodate modem technology for fulfilling the tasks envisioned in
1933, when technology did not include even the chain saw to clear the West
to supply the East with prospectuses, does not address the question of whether
those tasks would have been otherwise defined if such technology was
anticipated.
Before the architecture of an electronic-based securities act can be
considered, there needs to be some concurrence of opinion regarding the
objective sought by a securities act-a theoretical basis needs to be
developed. This inquiry essentially recasts the debate on the purpose of
mandatory disclosure rules. While this discussion focuses on whom the
objective of the disclosures is-sophisticated market professionals or widows,
widowers and orphans37-its outcome is dominated by the more sweeping
consideration of whether the objective of disclosure is to seek price accuracy
or merely facilitate comparisons among competing securities. 3
35. Professional obligations also discipline brokers by requiring brokers to know both their
customer and the recommended security. JAMES D. Cox ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATIONS CASES AND
MATERIALS 1096-1109 (2d ed. 1997).
36. Thus far the SEC has proceeded cautiously and flexibly in its embrace of electronic delivery
or prospectuses. See Use of Electronic Media for Delivery Purposes, Securities Act Release No. 7233,
60 SEC Docket (CCH) 1091 (Oct. 6, 1995); Use of Electronic Media for Delivery Purposes, Securities
Act Release No. 7234, [1995-1996 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,702, at 87,112 (Oct.
6, 1995). On the need for SEC to further liberalize the prospectus delivery requirements so that
Internet technology can be more fully accommodated, see Robertson, Personal Investing in
Cyberspace and the Federal Securities Laws, 23 SEC. REG. L.J. 347, 381-97 (1996).
37. See generally COX ET AL., supra note 35, at 250-56.
38. For the view that SEC policies, apparently designed to assure accuracy in securities prices,
exacerbate the burdens of SEC disclosure requirements, see Edmund W. Kitch, The Theory and
Practice of Securities Disclosure, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 763 (1995).
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Questions regarding the relative accuracy of the stock prices and
comparative investment choices are at the heart of the commentators'
criticisms of the SEC's invocation of the efficient market hypothesis to
support many of its deregulatory initiatives. For example, Professor Donald
Langevoort has insightfully questioned the SEC's invocation of the efficient
market hypothesis to justify its adoption of integrated disclosure and shelf
registration procedures.39 Professor Langevoort premises his criticism on the
weight of recent empirical work supporting the view that capital markets are
noisy markets such that market prices for publicly traded securities frequently
vary from the security's intrinsic value.4 ° He reasons that, regardless of
whether a prospectus is delivered in its traditional format or in the more
abbreviated format for issuers qualified to use either Forms S-2 or S-3 of the
SEC's integrated disclosure system, the result is still the same-the investor's
decision to purchase the security price will sometimes, perhaps even
frequently, be irrational.4' Professor Langevoort, therefore, concludes that
deregulatory initiatives, such as integrated disclosure or shelf registration,
could, as a practical matter, have been supported independently of the
efficient market hypothesis.42
39. Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and Securities Regulations: Market Efficiency
Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 851 (1992).
40. Id. at 866-72.
41. Id.at881.
42. Professor Langevoort offers many possible explanations for the SEC's invocation of market
efficiency. He suggests that (1) the SEC somewhat overstated the role of the efficient market
hypothesis in its decision, (2) the SEC misunderstood the tentativeness of the hypothesis in light of
available empirical work, (3) the SEC's visible reliance on the efficient market hypothesis was a
pretext to diminish investor protection by reducing the likelihood that the certification process under
integrated disclosure could be carried out with the same degree of rigor as outside the integrated
disclosure system, and (4) the SEC was garnering support with its external constituencies. Id. at 886-
88.
This author has a very different reaction to driving force for integrated disclosure, and more
particularly the shelf registration procedures. First, when integrated disclosure was being considered,
the United States was undergoing several important social forces. It was in the grips of the worst
recession since the Great Depression. More importantly, it was at the early stages of an important
deregulation movement, a movement that started under President Carter and became more wide spread
with President Reagan taking office in 1981. In addition, there was a great malaise regarding the
United States' competitive position in world markets. This force introduced several deregulatory
efforts by the SEC, like Regulation D, and Congress sought to propel further SEC deregulation by
enacting the Small Business Issuers' Simplification Act of 1980, Pub. Law 96-477, 94 Stat. 2294. This
Act, among other steps, raised the exemption provided by section 3(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (1994), to
$5 million, and also approved an exemption in section 4(6), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(6) (1994), for accredited
investors.
Second, the frequency of large issuers raising funds in Europe drove integrated disclosure.
Integrated disclosure, and the shelf registration procedures, were competitive regulatory responses to
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Similarly, Professor Lynn Stout has challenged the SEC's preoccupation
with market efficiency in its formulation of regulatory policies regarding
insider trading, program trading, and the disclosure of merger negotiations.
She contends that there is weak theoretical support for the SEC's view that
securities prices established in trading markets influence important resource
allocation decisions.' Much like Professor Langevoort, important to her
argument is whether securities prices reflect the underlying intrinsic value of
the traded security.'
Professors Langevoort and Stout have disrobed the SEC's use of the
efficient market hypothesis so that regulatory initiatives taken in reliance on
the hypothesis appear to lack a defensible theoretical basis. Any call for a new
electronic-based securities act that builds upon these earlier SEC initiatives
runs the risk of being subject to the same critical response as that raised by
Professors Langevoort and Stout. Thus, the following discussion defends the
SEC's reliance on the efficient market hypothesis for its deregulation of the
offering process by permitting integrated disclosures and broadening the
scope of shelf registrations. This defense is not made for the SEC's benefit,
but for the purpose of providing a theoretical foundation for a true company
registration system that would be at the heart of an electronic-based securities
act.
For convenience, it is useful to divide market efficiency into its various
possible meanings. At the most basic level, market efficiency refers to the
informational efficiency of trading markets. This level of efficiency is
strongly supported through classic event studies that measure the relative
rapidity of stock prices to announcements of economically significant
place U.S. capital markets on a footing that could compete with London. See generally Cox Er AL,
supra note 35, at 217-18, 223-24, 272-74. In combination, these considerations support Professor
Langevoort's more general description that the content of securities regulation, and more specifically,
the SEC, are each responsive to political and social forces, especially when those forces bear the
banner of "Let's get America moving again."
43. Lynn A. Stout, The Unimportance of Being Efficient: An Economic Analysis of Stock Market
Pricing and Securities Regulation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 613 (1988).
44. Id. at 616. Professor Stout's focus, however, is not on disclosure mechanisms, but on SEC
policy regarding insider trading, program trading and the disclosure of merger negotiations. One may
well agree that the SEC's regulatory initiative may only marginally promote market efficiency. Id at
638. However, the actual emphasis of her article is on the more important debunking that securities
markets are allocationally efficient. Id. at 641-77. As will be developed later, even if one accepted
Professor Stout's major thesis that securities markets fail in their function to facilitate the allocation of
resources, this conclusion has no impact on the regulatory mechanisms for carrying out the most basic
function of the securities laws, providing investors with an opportunity to make informed choices and
discouraging fraudulent promotion practices.
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information. A finding that markets are informationally efficient, however,
says nothing about whether the stock prices formed in such a market reflect a
security's "true" intrinsic value. The capacity of stock prices in securities
markets to represent that security's intrinsic value refers to fundamental
market efficiency. Whether markets are fundamentally efficient is a more
difficult proposition to test; absent a supreme being who can testify regarding
any given security's intrinsic value, a surrogate for value must be used against
which observed stock price behavior is assessed. Any examination of
observed stock prices against the surrogate price derived from a model
designed to forecast the security's intrinsic value surely will meet with the
double concerns regarding the accuracy of the observations and the reliability
of the forecasted surrogate price. Though there is much debate over the
relative reliability of the surrogates used in such studies, there is a great body
of evidence that rejects the notion that securities markets are fundamentally
efficient.45 The final, and arguably most important, form of efficiency is
allocational efficiency. This refers to the role securities prices established in
trading markets have in the allocation of resources among competing
investment opportunities. This level of efficiency is not likely to be
documented or rejected empirically, though theorists provide support for the
important social function trading markets play in the allocation of resources.46
However, those theorists assume accurate measurements of risk and return in
stock prices so that the capacity of trading markets to be allocationally
efficient would appear to depend on an independent finding that capital
markets were fundamentally efficient which, as seen above, is not supported'
by existing data.
Just as politics is the art of the possible, one can say the same for the
design of a securities regulation system. A disclosure system that quests
accuracy in securities prices is likely to prove disappointing, and any
regulatory initiative founded on assuring that trading markets fulfill the goal
of allocational efficiency will surely meet with strong criticism, if not
skepticism. First, the quest for accuracy will elicit much larger amounts of
45. See generally Lawrence A. Cunningham, From Random Walks to Chaotic Crashes: The
Linear Genealogy of the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 546 (1994);
Langevoort, supra note 39, at 857-72. For a more technical review on the empirical work examining
market efficiency and the detracting theory that markets are noisy, see Eugene F. Fama, Efficient
Capital Markets: 11, 46 J. FiN. 1575 (1991).
46. See, e.g., Eugene F. Fama & Arthur B. Laffler, Information and Capital Markets, 44 . BUs.
289 (1971); Jack Hirshleifer, The Private and Social Value ofInformation and the Reward to Incentive
Activity, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 561 (1971).
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information from issuers; the cost of producing this information is not limited
to the person hours required for its assembly, but the more important costs of
giving away potential competitive advantages the firm may otherwise enjoy if
such sensitive information remained proprietary information.47 Second, if
capital markets are noisy markets, as suggested by most of the empirical
evidence, there is a phenomenon within the investor community that prevents
fundamental market efficiency, such that the considerable costs of the
heightened disclosure the SEC believes necessary for the accuracy of prices
in securities may not be rewarded by the benefits of prices that are indeed
accurate.48 A third concern is whether a sufficient case has been made for an
unannounced public goal that security prices be accurate when we do not
have such a goal for most other components of our economy. Certainly the
pricing mechanism for such important commodities as oil, soybeans, and
treasury bills are no more "accurate" as the pricing mechanism for IBM
shares. Just as the announced regulatory policies for basic commodities is that
of facilitating market forces, rather than a policy of assuring the assets are
traded at their intrinsic value, one would expect the same policy for securities
markets.
It is quite likely that Professor Langevoort, and other critics of SEC
regulatory initiatives," overstate their criticism. For example, the important
contribution of the integrated disclosure system and shelf registration
initiatives was the substantial reduction in the amount of information that
must be created and distributed in the prospectus. For example, the
prospectus for registrants eligible to register securities on Form S-2 is the
issuer's most recent Form 10-K supplemented by the new information
pertinent to the offering."0 And, for the larger registrant qualified to use Form
S-3, the prospectus is leaner yet, as there is no need to circulate the
information contained in Form 10-K.5 Integrated disclosure thus relies on the
most basic form of market efficiency, the belief that markets are
informationally efficient. The integrated disclosure initiative depends not at
47. See Kitch, supra note 38.
48. See Cunningham, supra note 45, at 592-93; Jonathan A. Shayne & Larry D. Soderquist,
Ineffciency in the Market for Initial Public Offerings, 48 VAND. L. REV. 965 (1995).
49. See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Komhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information,
and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761, 813-23 (1985).
50. Form S-2, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 8061, at 7173-75 (May 11, 1995) [hereinafter Form
S-2].
51. Form S-3, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 8061, at 7185-86 (May 11, 1995) [hereinafter Form
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all on the capacity of securities markets to move the registered security's price
to its intrinsic value in response to the registrant's filings with the SEC.
Moreover, the abbreviated prospectus for Form S-3 qualified registrants
merely reflects the conclusion that the bulk of the information for the offering
is sufficiently public; this conclusion is not dependent on the price of the
security reflecting the security's intrinsic value. The premise for integrated
disclosure is that information for certain types of companies is as accessible if
on file with the SEC as it would be if physically delivered to prospective
investors.
Similarly, shelf registration relaxes the requirements that issuers can only
register that quantity of shares they then intend to sell and permits issuers to
sell their securities as market conditions warrant. The shelf rule implicates
market efficiency because it is limited to issuers qualified to use Form S-3;
hence, shelf registrants may use an abbreviated prospectus with markets being
informed by the more comprehensive information about the registrant and the
offering on file with the SEC. These initiatives did not require a finding that
markets are fundamentally efficient, but rather a finding that for some issuers
information filed with the SEC is as readily available as if the information
were circulated through a prospectus in the traditional manner.
The most basic objective of an electronically-based securities act is that
embraced in the Securities Act itself, namely arming investors with sufficient
information to make a fair comparison among competing securities. Just as in
1933, a regulatory policy founded on this belief does not also require a belief
that investors will rationally respond to the information made available to
them, an electronic-based securities act would not have among its goals, or
even considerations, whether investors respond rationally to the information
when that information is disclosed. The act may well proceed on the
assumption that securities prices are formed through a much longer time
frame and with more chaos in that process than earlier research suggested.
Though the SEC disclosure requirements are largely aimed at enhancing price
accuracy and have greatly expanded since 1933, the bedrock of the Securities
Act is enabling investors to make fair comparisons among securities."2 If this
were the objective of the electronic-based securities act, the act would not
require proof that capital markets are either fundamentally or allocationally
efficient. The objective of the act should be investor protection with the
52. There is the related objective, discussed later, of reducing the incidence of fraudulent
offerings through the attestation function implicit in section 11 liability standards.
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correlative benefit that the act would reduce the amount of money devoted to
nonproductive fraudulent activities. Such an approach would be consistent
with our society's overall commitment to market-based, rather than
regulation-based, solutions. The electronic-based securities act need not,
however, depend entirely on the capital market being informationally
efficient Indeed, in a world linked by fiber much of this concern is moot.
It is paradoxical that technology can today, on the one hand, liberate the
Securities Act from its transactional orientation and thereby dramatically alter
its content, and, on the other hand, fulfill the vision of the seventy-third
Congress. With respect to its goal of the broad dissemination of information
bearing on the public offering of a security, regulation took a path dependent
on the world as it was understood in 1933,"s when the norm was that capital-
raising occurred through a single transaction, the public offering of securities,
and the medium for the distribution of information was paper based. The
central objective of the Securities Act is the filtration process by which the
most salient portions of the registration statement are circulated among
investment professionals and investors via a prospectus. Integrated disclosure
has partially brought this process into more modem times by recognizing that
filtration occurs, in the case of some companies, as effectively through a
filing with the SEC as with the physical circulation of the registration
statement's contents among broker-dealers and investors. The recent
recommendations for a company registration system by the Advisory
Committee on Regulatory and Capital Formation Processes would carry the
integrated disclosure system to the next level, at least for those companies
deemed worthy of such beneficial treatment 4 The suggestion here is that
technology should permit continuous company registration to be the norm for
the electronic-based securities act." Just as the Securities Act fulfilled the
national goal by relying on the filtration of the registration statement's
contents through pervasive and elaborate prospectus delivery procedures, it
would appear that resort to the Internet and, more precisely, the World Wide
Web, could equally serve this purpose today. That is, at the heart of an
electronic-based securities act will be an information dissemination
requirement that casts aside the baggage of the paper-based system. Much
like the Securities Act, a basic information package and transaction specific
53. See generally Mark A. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV.
641 (1996).
54. Report of the Advisory Committee, supra note 6, at 127.
55. See infra text accompanying notes 84-88.
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information will be delivered electronically to all those involved in the
distribution. It should also be possible to require even wider circulation,
including to the Internet addresses of investors likely to be offered the
security, but to whom offers have not yet been made.
The SEC may also consider melding these prospectus delivery
requirements with other regulatory initiatives. For example, one possible
regulatory response to the problem of cold calls is to require the electronic
delivery of a prospectus or information regarding companies to be
recommended or being promoted prior to the broker's call. Somewhat related,
questions of customer suitability can be coupled with exemptions that would
limit canvassing investors to those within the broker's electronic files that
have met certain eligibility requirements. Such customers may all be armed
with apassword that enables them to visit the broker's web page that displays
information regarding promoted offerings.5 6
A further consideration is including various rating agencies among those
to whom the electronic prospectus is delivered, thus further facilitating a role
of alternative information sources regarding offerings. The overall objective
of all such initiatives is that technology permits not only rapid dissemination
of information to discrete groups of investors but that technology also permits
efficient discrimination among investor groups so that this power can be
effectively harnessed in an electronic-based securities act to fulfill classic
regulatory objectives.
The Securities Act seeks to fulfill two very different goals. In addition to
the goal of facilitating investors to make meaningful comparisons among
competing offerings, there is also the objective of reducing fraudulent
offerings. But for the Exchange Act, the seventy-third Congress would have
been accused of an acute case of myopia had it limited regulation to public
offering of securities, because comparative assessments involve comparing
securities sold through a public offering with those available in trading
markets. We may conclude that but for a concern for deterring fraudulent
offerings the disclosure process for public offerings should be
indistinguishable from that for publicly traded securities. In the 1930s, and
even through most of the 1980s, information dissemination processes were
paper based so that the transaction orientation of the Securities Act was the
56. See IPONET, SEC No-Action Letter [1996 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
77,252 (July 26, 1996) (providing a password to accredited investors for accessing the broker's web
page information about on-going Regulation D offerings does not constitute a general solicitation in
violation of Regulation D's anti-solicitation requirements).
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most practicable means for assuring the wide distribution of information. But
that was then and this is now. If the goal of the electronic-based securities act
is simply to facilitate comparative assessments among securities-what to
buy, what to sell-a wide adoption of a company registration system, built on
the architecture of the World Wide Web (no doubt with special downloading
and delivery requirements on broker-dealers with respect to their customers
who do not enjoy direct access to the Web) would be the act's linchpin. As
discussed earlier, there is little reason to believe such a system would be any
the less effective than the paper-based filtration system that prevails under the
Securities Act. Thus, if facilitating investor comparisons were the sole goal of
the electronic-based age securities act that act would have continuous
reporting requirements similar to those of the Exchange Act with modest
requirements for providing paper bound copies to those investors who lack
computer access. This, of course, invites difficult questions regarding the duty
of registrants to update their periodic filings57 and perhaps some concern for
cooling off periods between such an update and the offering of the securities.
But the larger concern, discussed in the next section, arises in fulfilling the
Securities Act's second goal, the deterrence of fraudulent offerings.
III. WHERE TO PLACE THE SPEED BUMP
Informational efficiency, therefore, provides a useful framework to
examine the mechanisms for carrying out the Securities Act's important
information dissemination function. However, market efficiency provides no
guidance regarding the other objective of the Securities Act, verifying the
accuracy of the registrant's disclosures. The verification function arises
through section 11 liability and section 12(a)(2)'s discipline of those who
commit misrepresentations in promoting the security. The express liability
provisions impose their own discipline on the offering process so that
investors resorting to the registration statement for self-protection may only
be of secondary importance."' To be sure, integrated disclosure does not
57. For an analysis of how the SEC's failure to establish clear guidelines for its registrants'
obligations to update and correct information is related to the orderly development of a truly
continuous reporting system, see Donald C. Langevoort, Toward More Effective Risk Disclosure for
Technology-Enhanced Investing, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 753 (1997).
58, See Carl W. Schneider et aL, Going Public: Practice, Procedure, and Consequences, 27
VILL. L. REv. 1, 4 (1981) (registration statement and resulting prospectus have dual purpose of
promoting security and shielding issuer, underwriters, and others involved in the security's distribution
from liability for misrepresentation).
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protect investors from following the herd blindly over the cliff, but neither
does the Securities Act's traditional registration process. But if a
misrepresentation was committed, sections 11 and 12(a)(2) can provide them
with a softer landing once they take the plunge.
So viewed, it might be said that the Securities Act is a simple piece of
legislation; the Act imposes disclosure obligations and enforces those
obligations through its express liability provisions, primarily section 11. It is
not just Regulations S-X and S-K that expand the typical registration
statement's girth. The private right of investors to sue under section 11 and
the general antifraud provision elicit not only defensive disclosures, but quite
probably disclosures that are scrubbed by the registrant's attorneys to assure
the right flavor of blandness-not too pessimistic and only qualifiedly
optimistic. Section 11, together with the SEC's review of registration
statements, are the bulwark against deceptive offerings. Though the registrant
has a stake in the registration statement being free of material omissions and
misstatements because its liability in such case is absolute, the true measure
of protection comes by section 1l's burdens on the issuer's senior officers
and directors, as well as the offering's underwriters and accountants, whose
due diligence obligations enlist their professional efforts for the protection of
investors. 9 As among those burdened with section 11 liability, certainly none
is more likely to discharge their public obligations with more independence
and skill than the issuer's underwriters. Others involved in the security's
distribution, though they bear no responsibilities under section 11, are subject
to liability for any deception committed by them, either under section
12(a)(2) or the Exchange Act's antifraud provisions, section 10(b) and Rule
1Ob-5.' Neither of these provisions, however, carries the full protective force
59. Section 11(a) provides an exclusive list of defendants. Senior officers become subject to
section 11 by signing the registration statement, and directors are expressly designated as defendants.
See Securities Act of 1933 § 1 l(a)(1), (2), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(1), (2) (1994). In 1933, this posed less of
an burden on the directors than it does today because, by comparison to contemporary practices, most
directors were also officers of the company and, hence, more familiar with the business. Today, section
I 1 burdens are significantTor outside directors whose remoteness from the registrant underscores the
need to consider how such directors fulfill their duty to conduct the "reasonable investigation" leg of
section I I's due diligence requirement.
60. Before the Supreme Court, in Lampf Pleva, Lipklnd Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501
U.S. 350 (1991), required that the limitations period for implied causes of action equal that for express
causes of action, litigants could circumvent section 1l's shorter limitations period by bringing suit
under the Exchange Act's antifraud provision, section 10(b), and Rule lOb-5. See, e.g., Herman &
MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375 (1983). After Gilbertson, the antifraud provision could expand
liability beyond the more narrow group of defendants specified in section 1 (a).
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that section 11 does, because they do not require, for example, the
underwriter to undertake a reasonable investigation or have a reasonable basis
for believing the registration statement is free of omissions or misstatements
of material fact.6 '
It is in section I l's broad protection of investors that we find the greatest
impediment to reconfiguring the Securities Act's registration process.62 So
long as section 11 liability continues to attach to public offerings, the
securities registration process will continue to have a transactional focus. For
example, though integrated disclosure and even the shelf registration
procedures purported to join the registration of securities to the Exchange
Act's continuous reporting provisions, data supports the view that
registration, even for registrants qualified to use Form S-3, remains an
episodic event.63 This occurs because the issuer's, and more importantly its
underwriters', section 11 liabilities are set when the Form S-3 registration
statement becomes effective. All efforts focus on that moment to assure that
materials incorporated by reference into that registration statement are free of
material omissions and misstatements. Indeed, the proposals for a company
registration system underscores that integrated disclosure remains anchored in
a transactionally oriented system, as it has since the Great Depression. The
proposed company registration system calls for the filing of an expanded
Form 8-K when securities are to be offered to the public. The Advisory
Committee's proposals preserve section 11 liability for all the registrant's
filings that are connected to the offering, so that its officers', directors',
accountants', and underwriters' due diligence obligations extend beyond the
narrow confines of the Form 8-K filing.
The Advisory Committee found it useful to consider section 1l's
connection to the registration of securities as analogous to a speed bump; it is
61. But see Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 619 F.2d 1222 (7th Cir. 1980) (underwriter of an
unregistered offering held to have a duty under section 12(a)(2) to investigate the offering brochure's
financial statements for material omissions and misstatements). See Associated Randall Bank v.
Griffin, Kubik, Stephens & Thompson, Inc. 3 F.3d 208 (7th Cir. 1993) (questioning the dicta in
Sanders). For the view that expanding section 12(a)(2) due care standard to impose a duty to
investigate is inconsistent with Congress' intent in drafting section 11, see John Nuveen & Co. v.
Sanders, 450 U.S. 1005 (1981) (dissent of Justice Powell to denial ofcert petition).
62. This is the source of the separate statements by Messrs. Greene and Sonsini and Professor
Coffee in the Report of the Advisory Committee on the Capital Formation and Regulatory Processes.
See Report of the Advisory Committee, supra note 6, at 36-41.
63. See Report of the Advisory Committee, supra note 6, app. A, tbl. 2, at 48 (average times
during 1994 and 1995 that a Form S-3 and Form S-2 are with the SEC before becoming effective are
9.3 days and 15.6 days, respectively.).
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a moment of caution and focus as the issuer drives toward ravenous
investors.' The Advisory Committee, following the approach the SEC took
earlier with its integrated disclosure initiatives, saw the event of registration
as an appropriate time for seasoned issuers to review closely their Exchange
Act reports that would be integrated into their Securities Act registration
statement As discussed earlier, integrated disclosure thus had the impact of
increasing the quality of an Exchange Act filing by subjecting it, in such
transactions, to the due diligence obligations imposed on certain parties by
section 11. The Advisory Committee's report affirms its commitment to
preserving the speed bump before the public offering of securities, so that a
good portion of its report is a discussion of how this can be accomplished in
the context of an "evergreen" registration statement.65
Three members of the Advisory Committee sounded a cautionary note
that the steps to be applied for companies electing to participate in the pilot
program would be more burdensome than if the companies carried out their
public offerings under the standard integrated offering procedures.6 This
cautionary qualification no doubt understates the problem. The concern is not
simply that optional systems, such as that recommended by the Advisory
Committee, will be foregone by issuers that will register their securities under
an approach that requires fewer burdens, but that issuers will forego entering
the registration system at all because by doing so it incurs known and
unknown costs imposed by section 11. As seen earlier, issuers can forego
registration, but incur other costs, such as share discounts, by selling their
securities in mechanisms that carry explicit or implicit resale restrictions.
Thus, by locating the speed bump in the path of an issuer entering capital
markets, the bump not only diverts traffic to a back street but fails to achieve
the level of protection for those in the path of the speeding issuer. The issuer's
successful resort to an exempt means of distributing its securities leaves U.S.-
based investors dependent on Exchange Act information for their protection
and information sources. This should cause one to wonder whether there is a
means to reduce issuer regulatory costs of registering public offerings,
enhance the quality of Exchange Act reports, and provide greater investor
protection. The following suggest that an electronic-based securities act can
make this possible by both redesigning and moving the speed bump.
64. Id. at 37 n.4.
65. Id. at 29-34.
66. See Separate Statement of John C. Coffee, Jr., Edward F. Greene, and Lawrence W. Sonsini.,
Report of the Advisory Committee, supra note 5, at 36.
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It may well be that the benefits of section 11 liability are vastly overstated.
To be sure, there is great intuitive appeal for the view that the quality of SEC
filings policed by section 11 are more likely to be greater than those policed
by the antifraud provision, which imposes the less demanding scienter
standard for liability in connection with material omissions or
misstatements. 67 Thus, one may reason that the SEC's earlier embrace of
integrated disclosure was pro-regulatory and not deregulatory because the
SEC's actions raise the quality of Exchange Act filings by raising the level of
responsibility to assure that those filings did not include material omissions or
misstatements.
In view that the underwriter is the most central figure in the protection
section 11 offers for investors, it should be noted that in most cases there may
be an even more powerful force protecting investors, namely the
underwriter's reputation and its on-going relationship with the investors to
whom the securities are offered." With the increasing institutionalization of
the public offering market, established and on-going relationships between
underwriters and their institutional clients can be expected to pique the
underwriter's interest to review closely the offering and its registrant before
selling it to the institution. Section 11 may, of course, be seen as further
bonding the underwriter's undertaking to its client; in this sense, section 11
may be rationalized as a convenient "off-the-rack" rule that the parties would
have contracted for, if contracting were costless. At the same time, it is
equally plausible that the institutional client will be sufficiently resourceful to
consider the offering's risks and may well prefer that the registrant's offering
costs not include a charge for implicit insurance that the registration statement
is not defective.69
67. The discontinuity between the liability standards that customarily police Exchange Act
filings and the section 11 demands with respect to when such filings are incorporated into registration
statements prepared on Forms S-2 and S-3 was a source of great concern when the integrated
disclosure system was adopted. See, e.g., Securities Act Release No. 6499, [1983-1984 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,449, at 86,335 (Nov. 17, 1983); Edward F. Greene, Determining
the Responsibilities of Underwriters Distributing Securities Within an Integrated Disclosure System,
56 NOTRE DAME LAW. 755, 787-90 (1981).
68. See Michael P. Dooley, The Effects of Civil Liability on Investment Banking and the New
Issues Market, 58 VA. L. REV. 776,785-87 (1972).
69. See Barbara A. Banoff, Regulatory Subsidies. Efficient Markets, and Shelf Registration: An
Analysis of Rule 415, 70 VA. L. REV. 135, 183 (1984) (if given a choice, investors may prefer not to
incur the imputed costs of underwriters' section 11 liability); Donald C. Langevoort, Information
Technology and the Structure of Securities Regulation, 98 HARV. L. REV. 747, 776-78 (1985) (Section
11 may well frustrate the development of alternative mechanisms by which underwriters provide
verification or protection to investors.).
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An additional consideration here is that in the process of underwriting, a
social hierarchy exists in which higher quality registrants attach themselves to
higher quality underwriters." One would expect that the higher quality
underwriters, in general, have a substantial interest in preserving their
reputations, so that this provides an independent incentive for such
underwriters to scrutinize the registrant and its proposed offering. At the same
time, lower quality underwriters have a narrower range of underwritings and,
generally, underwriter offerings of lower quality issuers. It may well be that
section 11 liability should thus have its greatest role in steeling the resolve of
the lower reputation underwriters to assure that fall and fair disclosure occurs
in connection with the offering. Theory suggests that section 11 liability, or
more generally, the scope of liability, should follow a crude spectrum that
turns on the reputational quality of the issuer and its underwriters."
Setting aside the difficult measurement problem for such a spectrum, there
is a need to chasten theory with evidence from the real world. In a recent
study of securities fraud action arising from initial public offerings, Professors
Bohn and Choi provide several interesting insights.72 First, serious
underenforcement of section 11 occurs in the case of small public offerings.
That is, Professors Bohn's and Choi's data reflect that, though one half of the
3,290 IPOs carried out from 1975 to 1986 were offerings below $6.71
million, this group accounted for only fourteen of the total 122 liability suits
experienced by the entire sample.73 Securities class actions more frequently
occur in connection with larger public offerings, no doubt reflecting the class
action attorney's need that there be sufficient sums in dispute to provide
reasonable compensation for her services. Related to this finding is that the
amount raised in an offering is positively correlated to the quality of the issuer
and its underwriters. 4 Consequently, there are few low quality issuers who
raise sufficient sums to expose themselves to suit under section 11. More
ominously, they found an eighty percent correlation between the reputation of
70. See, e.g., Glen A. Wolfe et. al., An Analysis of the Underwriter Selection Process for Initial
Public Offerings, 17 J. FIN. RES. 77 (1994) (underwriter reputation positively correlated with issuer
risk).
71. For a more sweeping consideration of how liability standards should be stratified depending
on issuer quality and size, see Stephen J. Choi, Company Registration: Toward a Status-Based
AntifraudRegime, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 567 (1997).
72. James Bohn & Stephen Choi, Fraud in the New-Issues Market: Empirical Evidence on
Securities Class Actions, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 903 (1996).
73. Id. tbl. 2.5, at 936.
74. Id. tbl. 3.2, at 956.
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an offering's underwriters and the suit75 Professors Bohn and Choi explain
this finding in terms of the strike suit thesis, namely that high quality
underwriters will settle baseless claims by paying a small amount in the suit's
settlement, rather than prolong the litigation process which would soil their
reputation.
Professors Bohn's and Choi's findings pose interesting policy dilemma
regarding the future of section 11. To preserve the action may serve no
greater function than to enable others to bludgeon high reputation
underwriters to settle questionable private actions. On the other hand, to
release high quality underwriters and their issuers from section 11 liability
may render section 11 nugatory because lower quality issuers raising smaller
amounts through a public offering are, as a practical matter, not an
economically viable target for the entrepreneurial class action attorney so that
the disciplinary effects of section 11 for such offerings are seriously
weakened. This dilemma, however, may tell us less about section 11 than it
does about the importance of review carried out by the SEC's staff.76 Those
subject to section 1 l's due diligence commands are not the exclusive
gatekeepers in this process. Aside from SEC staff review, the current
transaction orientation of the securities laws provides further investor
protection through the professional services of the issuer's attorneys. And,
even though the issuer's attorneys are not subject to section 11 liability, their
obligations in the registration process are nevertheless considerable.77 Those
deeply involved in their client's fraud incur primary participant liability under
Rule 10b-5,78 the attorney can be disciplined under the SEC's rules of fair
practice," and the attorney may also be subject to SEC enforcement sanctions
as the "cause" for her client's violation."0 More generally, the attorney's
75. Id. at 957-58.
76. See generally Abba D. Poliakoff, SEC Review: Comfort or Illusion?. 17 U. BALT. L. REV. 40
(1987). The SEC review process is an important independent check on the quality of the issuer's
disclosures. Not all registrants are subject to such review, and those that are reviewed do not receive it
with the same intensity. However, the SEC has over the years targeted its attention on the types of
registrants it believes are most likely to pose disclosure issues. Again, the larger, more seasoned
issuers escape close review, or any review, whereas IPO's and small issuers receive the closest review.
77. See The Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Report by Special Committee on
Lawyers'Role in Securities Transactions, 32 BUS. LAW. 1879 (1977); Schneider et. al., supra note 58.
78. See, e.g., Molecular Technology Corp. v. Valentine, 925 F.2d 910 (6th Cir. 1991).
79. Rules of Practice 102(e), 17 C.F.R. § 201.102 (1996).
80. Securities Act of 1933 § 8A, 15 U.S.C. § 77h-1 (1994) (for violations of section 17(a) of the
Securities Act); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21C, 15 U.S.C. 78u-3 (1994) (for violations of the
antifraud provision of the Exchange Act).
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reputational concerns rival those of underwriters, and those concerns are
underscored by state professional standards that, in general, proscribe
knowing involvement in the client's fraudulent actions. It should also be
observed here that the stronger the law firm's reputation the more concerned
it will be to preserve that reputation.
Line drawing is hard and, in the end, invariably the separation one makes
will be somewhat arbitrary. Hence, the placement of the speed bump will
always prove controversial. On this question, the Advisory Committee on the
Regulatory and Capital Formation Processes essentially punted. The
Advisory Committee recommended a "pilot program" for the proposed
company registration system limited to those with an equity float of $75
million. At the same time, the Advisory Committee believed there was no
need to relieve such registrants of their section 11 liability. Instead, the
Advisory Committee speculated that systems could be developed that would
fulfill the demands of section 11 with respect to information contained in its
Exchange Act filings.8'
There appears little justification to adopt a far reaching registration
procedure, such as that recommended by the Advisory Committee, while
continuing a liability regime that is anchored in the 1933 transaction-oriented
system, at least not without some profile of the companies whose registration
statements are defective. On this point, consider the extensive data gathered
by the Advisory Committee bearing on so many aspects of the registration
process, including costs, review time and offering size. 2 However, the
Advisory Committee did not collect any empirical data bearing on the
incidence or profile of companies whose registration statements were
misleading. We may speculate what the regulatory response would be if it
were determined that a very small percentage of reporting companies that
undertake public offerings have misleading registration statements, whereas
approximately ten percent of IPO offerings under $15 million have
misleading registration statements.8 3 Data along these lines would greatly
inform policy makers regarding the desirability of imposing section 11
liability on all registrants. Such data was apparently not before the Advisory
81. Among the "disclosure enhancements" called for by the Advisory Committee are top
management certifications of the completeness of the registrant's Forms 10-K and 10-Q, expansive
management reports to the registrant's audit committee, and expanded presentations of risk factors. See
Report of the Advisory Committee, supra note 6, at 29-31.
82. See id. app. A.
83. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text fora summary of Bohn & Choi's data.
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Committee.
IV. CONCLUSION: A PROPOSAL FOR REDESIGN
The benefits of the securities laws imposing speed bumps that require a
close review of the registrant's public disclosures appear beyond dispute.
What is in doubt is whether their costs exceed their benefits. The point of the
preceding was to suggest that whatever the balance of this social equation the
cost considerations are greatly exacerbated when the defining moment of the
speed bump is the public offering of securities. When it is the public offering
of securities that triggers section 11 liability concerns, and the attendant costs
of internal and SEC review, the attraction of the Securities Act's exemptions
are like the Sirens calling Ulysses to the shoals. Though the desirability of a
speed bump for the unseasoned issuer is easy to justify, imposing a like
burden in the path of every issuer that seeks additional capital is more
questionable. The regulatory challenge, therefore, appears to be two-fold:
identifying which issuers should be relieved of section 11 responsibilities as
we know them today and defining what responsibilities this lucky group of
issuers should have with respect to their public disclosures.
A truly continuous reporting system should provide for the periodic close
review of filings made with the SEC. This process need not occur yearly, but
should occur periodically, perhaps every third year. This approach would
appear to fulfill the goals of the Advisory Committee of enhancing the quality
of public disclosures by expanding section 11 standards to Exchange Act
reports. And, a true continuous reporting system would liberate the capital-
raising process from section 11 so that decisions on whether and how to raise
capital would not be compounded by the vagaries of section 11 liability.
However, it would be unwise to excuse all issuers from the scope of section
11. Even though section 1 l's burdens are probably heavier for this group of
issuers than for their more seasoned counterparts, it is just such a group of
issuers where we would expect the greatest disclosure problems may lurk in
the shadows of documents that otherwise were subject to only a scienter-
based standard of fault. The suggestion here is to preserve the section 11
liability for seasoned issuers, but not have that liability arise in connection
with the registration of securities. Public offerings by untested or financially
distressed issuers 4 should continue to be subjected to section 11.
84. The eligibility requirements of SEC Forms S-2 and S-3, conditioning eligibility to use the
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It would appear reasonable that the electronic-based securities act would
impose section 11 liability on offerings by companies that are not subject to
the Exchange Act's continuous reporting requirements, as well as reporting
companies that have been subject to financial distress within the past twelve
months.8 5 Admittedly, this treatment is founded solely on the intuitive belief
that there are many fewer external mechanisms for unseasoned companies
that exist which can protect investors from fraudulent or ill-conceived
ventures and that the management of companies experiencing serious
financial distress has powerful incentives to mislead investors.8 6 Thus, the
current regulatory system would hardly be changed for this group of
registrants.
The more seasoned registrants, under an electronic-based securities act,
could find the current section 11 responsibilities spread over an interval of
time with only mild section 11 interest being piqued by the public offering of
securities. Section 1l 's current liability standards for the issuer and its
officers, directors, and underwriters would apply to the reconfigured
transaction-specific information. "Due diligence" responsibilities would
extend not only to information bearing on the offering's terms and
arrangements with the underwriters, but more importantly, on the use of the
proceeds and a description of unusual risks facing the issuer in its business.
The preservation of section 11 for unusual risks facing the issuer is intended
to identify generally the type of information that the underwriter is likely to
consider in deciding whether to associate its reputation with the offering. That
is, the all-important role of the underwriter's due diligence requirement is
preserved for the type of inquiry the underwriters are likely to undertake in
considering its involvement in the offering. Neither its due diligence
obligation, nor that of others, will extend to many other areas that are
integrated disclosure system on having been a reporting company for at least 36 months, or 12 months
with a public float above $75 million, may offer guidance to issuers. Form S-2, supra note 50, General
Instructions LC., at 7172; Form S-3, supra note 51, General Instructions I.A.3. & I.B.I., at 7182-83.
Each imposes its own financial distress requirements by limiting elibility to firms that have not
defaulted or failed with respect to lease payments, preferred dividend requirements, or interest on long-
term debt. See Form S-2, supra note 50, General Instructions I.D., at 7172; Form S-3, supra note 51,
General Instructions LA.5., at 7182.
85. The Advisory Committee prescribed a two-year window which may well be desirable. The
one-year window suggested here is currently required for companies to be eligible to use Form S-3.
86. See Jennifer H. Arlen & William J. Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud on Securities
Markets: Theory and Evidence, 1992 U. ILL. L. REv. 691, 725 (Two-thirds of fraud on the market
cases in the 1975-90 sample involved managers purposely presenting a false impression of success
during a period of extreme financial distress for the firm.).
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included in the registration statements. Similarly, the due diligence obligation
of accountants for their certified financial statements continues because this
merely mirrors their professional obligations to the registrant. However, we
propose that the accountants' responsibility is set when they issue their
certification, and not, as presently is the case, when the registration statement
becomes effective. This effectively places much more importance on
management's intervening interim reports, for which the issuer's senior
officers and directors will become liable only if they fail to meet the "had no
reasonable ground to believe and did not believe" standard that currently
applies for such person's responsibility with respect to expertised portions"
of the registration statement.8"
The final component of this liability regime would be the triennial
requirement that all reporting companies submit a Form 10-K, for which due
diligence requirements for the registrant, as well as its senior officers and
directors, would attach to most portions of the disclosed information. The
exact portions of the triennial report that would be exempt from such due
diligence are best left for extended discussion within and without the SEC.
One could argue that those portions of the report that elicit forward-looking
information, like the current Management Discussion and Analysis of Item
303 of Regulation S-K, should be immune from a due diligence standard,
such as that presently emboded in section 11. However, both the "bespeaks
caution" doctrine and the statutory safe harbor for forward-looking
information would appear sufficiently broad to provide issuers protection so
that the effective costs of including such statements are within a due diligence
review. This would be justified by the view that section 1 1-like liability
should attach only to those historical or factual representations that are more
easily verifiable, thus enhancing the administrability of the new system. In
addition, by lifting section 11 liability for such disclosures, an important
subsidy is provided that will more likely elicit this type of information, albeit
surrounded by cautionary language sufficient to meet prevailing safe-harbor
standards. As for other areas that would be exempt, this should reflect the
Commission's cautious judgment However, the Commission must be
87. The issuer's liability would arise vicariously through either respondeat superior liabilty, see,
eg., Marbury Management, Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1980), or as a control person of its
officers and directors, Securities Act of 1933 § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1994). It would not have absolute
liabilty for such material misrepresentations as it does now. See Securities Act of 1933 § 11(b), 15
U.S.C. § 77k(b) (1994).
88. Securities Act of 1933 § I l(bX3XC), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3)(C) (1994).
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mindful that the effect of this proposal is to expand significantly the quality of
section 11 policed information because the recommendation set forth calls for
triennial review of all Exchange Act reports under section 11 standards.
With speed bumps recontoured and repositioned, regulation could then
better complement the filtration of information about registrants through the
electronic-based securities act. Dissemination would occur through the
mediums that are sought by investors and market professionals. Of course, the
above liabilty standards are not based nearly as much on whether the
registrant is traded in an efficient market, but on more paternalistic concerns
of whether the registrant falls within the profile of the type of company that
poses a serious disclosure risk to investors, such as being unseasoned or
recently suffering some observable financial distress. Thus, the computer,
even if not invented by Theodore Roosevelt, is a mere messenger. The
content of the message is very much shaped by close consideration of the
reasonableness of the regulatory burdens to be imposed on registrants. Under
an electronic-based securities act, the burdens will be greater, as all registrants
will undergo periodic due diligence reviews of their SEC filings, but the cost
of this additional burden will not be triggered by the the act of raising capital.
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